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600 LOPER V. MORRISON [230.2d 
[L. A. No. 18702. In Bank. Jan. 20, 1944.] 
ELSIE LOPER et al., Hespoudcnts, v. OAlVllGIWN E. MOR-
RISON et al., Defendants; ARDEN F AHlHS, INO. (a 
Oorporation), Appellant. 
[1] Automobiles-Persons Liable-Employer-Scope of J:1mploy-
ment.-An employee of a dairy corporation who was using his 
own automobile, after regular working hours, to collect a de-
linquent account when his cal' collided with another automobile 
was acting within the'scope of his employment, although the 
delinquent customer, whose credit had not been approved by 
the corporation, was classified as an "unauthorized account" 
and owed the corporation money when the employee took over 
the route, where collections made by the employee were turned 
over to the corporation and credited on the old balance, and 
w~ere, in attempting to collect the account, the employee was 
performing a duty imposed by his employer. 
[2] Id.-Eviclence--Sufficioncy-Authority of Employee.-In an 
action against a dairy corporation und its employee for in-
juries sustained in a collision with the employee's own automo-
bile while he was u5ing it, after regular working hours, to col-
· lect a deliuquellt account, evidenoe thut the employee, to his 
employer's knowledge, frequently called on customers after 
his'regular hours, using his OWn car, supported a finding that 
he was authorized to do this type of work at the time of the 
accident; 
"[Sa, Sbl ld.-Persons Liable-Employer-Scope of Employment-
.Business Personal to Employee.-In au action against a dairy 
corp~ration and its employee for injuries sustained in a colli-
sion with the employee's own automobile while he was using 
it, after regular working hours, to collect a delinquent account 
after he had taken another employee home, it could not be said, 
as a:matter of law, that in taking the other employee home the 
driver abandoned the business of his employer, entered upon 
· Ii. mission of his own and had not re-entered his employer'S 
· busi?ess when the accident occurred, where it was within his 
authority to collect accounts at that time. 
[1] See 2 Cal.Jur. Ten-year Supp. 491; 5 Am.Jur. 709. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 5J Automobiles, § 169(1); [2] Auto-
mobiles, § 243; [3] Automobiles, § 169(4); [4] Master and Servant, 
§ 207; [6, 7J Master and Servant; § 207(6); [8J Automobiles, § 291; 
[9-11J Evidence, § 326a; [12J Appeal and Error, § 1607; [13J Dam-
ages, § 95; [14J Appeal and Error, § 1533-3; [15, 16] Automobiles, 
§ 316; [17] Damages, § 207. 
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[4] Master and Servant-Liability to Third Persons-Scope of 
Employment.-In each case involving <:cope of employment, all 
of the relevant circumstances must be considered and weighed 
in relation to one another. 
[6] Automobiles-Persons Liable-Employer-Scope of Employ-
ment.-With regard to whether or not an employee of a dairy 
corporation, using his own automobile, after regular working 
hours, to collect a delinquent account after he had taken It fel-
low employee home, was acting within the scope of his employ-
ment at the time his car collided with another automobile, the 
factors to be considered are the intent of the employee, the 
nature, time and place of his conduct, his actual and implied 
authority, the work he was hired to do, the incidental acts that 
the employer should reasonably have expected would be done, 
and the amount of freedom allowed the employee in perform-
ing his duties. 
[6] Master and Servant-Liability to Third Persons-Scope of 
Employment-Acts of Servant for Independent Purpose.-An 
employer's liability is not necessarily terminated by reason of 
the fact that the employee combines a private purpose of his 
own with the business of his employer. 
[7] Id.-Liability to Third Persons-Scope of Employmen1i--'Acts 
of Servant for Independent Purpose.-An employee's deviation 
from the most direct route for the purpose of getting something 
to eat and taking a fellow employee home, before going to a 
Ilustomer's home to collect a delinquent account for his em-
ployer, does not necessarily constitute an abandonment of the 
employer's business. . 
[8] Automobiles - Pro'vince of Court and Jury - Employment -
Deviation from Employer's Business.-In an action against a 
dairy corporation and its employee for injuries sustained in a 
collision with the employee's own automobile while he was us-
ing it, after regular working hours, to collect a delinquent ac-
count, the employee's conduct, after finding no one at the delin-
quent customer's home, in going to a tavern and in taking a 
fellow employee home before returning to the customer's home, 
presented a question of fact as to whether the driver had en-
tirely abandoned the business of his employer. 
[9] Evidence-Documentary Evidence-Business Records.-The 
purpose of the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act 
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1953e-1953h) is to enlarge the operation 
of the business records exception to the hearsay evidence rule. 
[6] See 16 Cal.Jur.ll01; 35 Am.Jur. 989. 
[9] See 20 Am.Jur. 881. 
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[10] Id.-Documentary Evidence - Business Records - Hospital 
Records.-The business entry statutes are not limited to en-
tries in commercial enterprises, and hospital records are prop-
erly included within their operation. 
[11] Id.-Documentary Evidence-Business Records.-It is thE' 
object of the business records statutes to eliminate the neces-
sity of calling each witness, and to substitute the record of the 
transaction or event. It is not necessary that the person mak-
ing the entry have personal knowledge of the transaction. 
[12] Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Exclusion of Evi-
dence.-In an action for personal injuries requiring hospital 
care, while a nurses' record containing a written record 01 
opinions of nurses as to the physical condition of a hospital 
patient was relevant on the issue of the nature and extent of 
plaintiff's injuries, the exclusion of such evidence was not preju. 
dicial to defendant where such record, instead of refuting tes· 
timony that plaintiff suffered from headaches and many pain. 
ful bruises and sore spots, supported such testimony. 
[18] Damages - Excessive Damages - Personal Injuries. - An 
award of $2,000 to a wife and $600 to the husband for injuries 
sustained by the wife was not so excessive as to be disturbed on 
appeal, where the wife spent 26 days in the hospital, where her 
injuries caused her much pain and suffering, both physical and 
mental, while she was at the hospital and after she went home, 
where .doctor and hospital bills exceeded $400 and money was 
expended to repair the automobile involved in the accidl'nt, 
and where for some time the wife was unable to carry on .!Jer 
usual duties helping the husband with his business. 
[14] Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Remarks Respect-
ing Evidence.-In a personal injury action, remarks made by 
the trial judge to defendant's attorney in connection with rul-
ings on thE' admissibility of evidence did not constitute preju-
dicial misconduct, where such remarks could not be construed 
as indicating that the judge was partial toward plaintiff, and 
where the jury were specifically instructed that if the judge 
had said or done anything which indicated that he was inclined 
to favor either party, it should be disregarded. 
[15] Automobiles-Instructions-Employment-Respondeat Supe-
rior.-In an action against a corporation and its employee for 
injuries sustained when the employee's automobile collided with 
another automobile, the court did not err in giving instructions 
dealing with the doctrine of respondeat superior, where these 
instructions properly stated the theory found applicable in the 
case. 
[16] Id.-Instructions-Employment-Scope of Employment.-In 
an action against a corporation and its employee for injuries 
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t ·. d when the employee's automobile collid?d withfi ~n­sus ame t . . tructlOns de nmg 
other car, it was not erro~ t~ ~~fus:heo ::.~e ::::t abandomnent of 
scope of employment an s a mg I from lia-~~ft~,y:~:!eb!t~!: ;:f~~~~:se~;~ct t!:r:m~:?neradeqUateIY 
covered these subjects. 
F t Pain and Suffering.-In a 
[17] Damage~Instr~~tio~~a: n~~eerror to give instructions deal-
personal mJury ac lOn, 1 h there was testimony that at the 
ing with futur~ dlamla?et"ffw e:: still suffering from headaches, 
time of the trIa p am 1 w . 
nervousness and pain. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Leslie E. Still, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for damages for injuries sustained in an automobile 
accident. Judgment for plaintiffs affirmed. 
Russell H. Pray, Henry F. Walker, S. J. Nordorf and 
William C. Price for Appellant. 
h A B 11 Albert D. White and Kenneth Sperry for Josep . a, 
Respondents. 
GIBSON, C. J.-Mrs. Elsie Loper (h~reafter called plain-
t'ff) d her husband brought this action for damages. re-s~ltina; from an automobile accident in w:i~h b~ c~:f::~:: 
b Mrs Loper was struck by one opera e Jorriso~, an employee of defendant Arden Farms, Inc. Fro~ 
a judgment against both defendants, Arden Farms, Inc. (here 
after called defendant) alone has appealed. k d l' . 
. 1 d by defendant to ma e e lverles MorrlSon was emp oye .. d' t d rea 
of milk and other dairy products Wlthm a eSI~a e aD' 
to collect from cust?mers and to so.li~itd n~w. :~~:-:~t b~~ 
liveries were made m a truck furms e Y d 'r't 
Morrison used his own car in collecting accounts an so ICI • 
in new business after regular hours. , ~n the afternoon of the accident Morrison left defendant s 
ffi . h's own car to call on a prospective customer and to o ce In 1 M H He was 
collect a delinquent account from a rs. anson. 
accompanied by Edward Dolan, a fello~ employee, to. whom 
he had offered a ride home. After .calhng on the .new cus-
tomer they went to the Hanson reSIdence about 4.00 p. :-
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linquent for some time, and Morrison had made numerous 
unsuccessful attempts to collect it. He had learned from 
past ~xperience ~hat the Hansons were likely to be at home 
later m the. eVelll?~, and he decided to call again about 5 :30 
p. m. WhIle waItmg for Mrs. Hanson to return Morrison 
who had not eaten since breakfast, went with Dolan to ~ 
tavern near Dolan's home for a lunch of sandwiches and 
beer, and then took ?olan home. The accident happened 
about 5 :30 p. m. whIle Morrison, returning from Dolan's 
~ome, 'was on his way to collect the Hanson account. Dolan 
lIved about two ~il.es outside the area covered by the milk 
route, and the collIsIOn occurred before Morrison reached the 
boundaries of his route. 
. [1~ Defendant contends that Morrison was not acting 
wIthm the scope of his employment at the time of the acci-
dent. ~irst, it is argued that the IIanson account was owed 
to MorrIson personally and that in attempting to collect the 
same he was engaged in his own business. Certain customers 
whos.e credi;, had not been approved by defendant were 
classIfied as . u~~utborized accounts." Ddvers were required 
to assume lIabIlity and furnish bond to protect defendant 
from losses caused by the failure of such customers to pay 
for prod,?-cts sold them. Such liability did not attach, how-
ever, unt1~ a~ter the employment of the driver was terminated, 
and was lImIted to a tota! of $100. Approximately one-third 
of th~ ,customers. on MorrIson's route, including Mrs. Hanson, 
were unauthorIzed accounts." Mrs. Hanson, who had been 
a customer. of Arden for a long time, owed defendant $25 
~hen MorrISon took over the route. Although Morrison con-
tI?ued to deliver dairy products to her, collections made by 
hIm were turn:d over to defendant and credited on the old 
b~la~ce. MorrIson worked on a straight salary with no com-
mISSIons, and all the money he collected was turned over to 
defendant. He did not buy milk from Arden and sell it to 
customers. The money due from Mrs. Hanson was owed 
t? defendant and in attempting to collect the account, Mor-
rl~o~ was performing a duty imposed by his employer and 
wIthm the. scope of .his employment. [2] And there is evidence 
that MorrIson, to hIS employer's knowledge frequently called 
up?n . custom~rs after his regular hours, ~sing his own car 
ThIS IS s~ffi.clent to support a finding that he was authorized 
to do thIS type of work at the time the accident took place. 
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[Sa] Defendant next contends that we are bound to con-
cluile as a matter of law, that when Morrison left the Hanson hous~ to take Dolan home, he abandoned the business of his 
employer and entered upon a mission of his own and had not 
re-entered his employer's business when the accident occurred, 
and that therefore he was not acting within the scope, of his 
employment at the time of the accident. Th~ general rule 
in these cases is stated in Kruse v. White Bros., 81 Cal.App., 
86, 93 [253 P. 178], recently quoted with approval in West-
berg v. Willde, 14 Cal.2d 360, 373 [94 P.2d 590] : ' "Whether 
there has been a deviation so material or substantial as to 
constitute a complete departure is usually a question of fact . 
In some cases the deviation may be so marked, and in others 
so slight relatively, that the court can say that no conclusion 
other than that the act was or was not a departure could 
reasonably be supported; while in still others the deviation 
may be so uncertain in extent and degree in view of the facts 
and circumstances as to make the question of what inferences 
should be drawn from the evidence properly one for the 
jury." (See also Rest., Agency, sec. 228, Comment d.) 
Courts have held as a matter of law that an employee was 
not in the scope of his employment when the evidence clearly 
showed a complete abandonment. (Gordoy v. Flaherty, 9 Cal. 
2d 716 [72 P.2d 538] ; Peccolo v. City of Los Angeles, 8 Cal. 
2d 532 [66 P.2d 651] ; Kish v. California State, Automobile 
Assn., 190 Cal. 246 [212 P. 27]; Martinelli v. Stabnau, 11 
Cal.App.2d 38 [52 P.2d 956] ; Ho;nchett v. Wiseley, 107 Cal. 
App. 230 [290 P. 311]; GOlf,sse v. Lowe, 41 Cal.App. 715 
[183 P. 295].) But in many other cal;!es it has been held 
that a jury question was presented. (Westberg v. Willde, 
14 Cal.2d 360 [94 P.2d 590]; Waack v. Maxwell Hardware 
Co., 210 Cal. 636 [292 P. 966] ; Cain v. Marquez, 31 Cal.App. 
2d 430 [88 P.2d 200] ; Kruse v. ",hite Bros., 81 Cal.App. 86 
[253 P. 178] ; Dennis v. Miller Autornobt1e Co., 73 Cal.App. 
293 [238 P. 739]; see 2 Mecham on Agency (2d ed.), sec. 
1916, p. 1491.) In deciding the case before us the results 
reached in other decisions are helpful but not necessarily 
controlling. (See Waack v. Maxwell Hardware Co., 210 Cal. 
636, 640 [292 P. 966].) [4] In each case involving scope 
of employment all of the relevant circumstances must be con-
sidered and weighed in relation to one another. (Waack v. 
Maxwell Hardware Co" 210 Cal. 636, 640 [292 P. 966] ; Cain 
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v. Marquez, 31 Cal.App.2d 430, 441 [88 P.2d 200]; Fiocco 
v. Garver, 234 N.Y. 219 [137 N.E. 309) j Bryan v. Bunis, 208 
App.Div. 389 [203 N.Y.S. 634]; 2 Mecham on Agency (2d 
ed.), sec. 1880, pp. 1461-1462, and, generally, pp. 1457-1491; 
Rest., Agency, secs. 228-237.) [5] Under these authorities the 
factors to be considered, insofar as pertinent to this case are 
the intent of the employee, the nature, time, and place of his 
c~nduct, his actual and implied authority, the work he was 
hIred to do, the incidental acts that the employer should 
reasonably have expected would be done, and the amount of 
freedom allowed the employee in performing his duties. 
cab] Under the circumstances of this case we cannot hold 
as a matter of law that Morrison's trip to the tavern and to 
Dol~n's home ~onstituted an abandonment of his employer's 
?usmess. As saId heretofore, it was within: Morrison's author-
Ity to collect accounts at the time the accident occurred. 
[6] The employer's liability was not necessarily terminated 
by reaso~ of the ~act that M?rrison combined a private pur-
?ose of hIS own WIth the busmess of his employer. As stated 
m Ryan v. Farrell, 208 Cal. 200, 204 [280 P. 945): "It is the 
estab~is?ed r~le in this jurisdiction that where the serv,ant is 
com~mmg hIS own business with that of his master, or at-
tendmg to both at substantially the same time no nice in-
quiry will be made as to which business the serv~nt was actu-
ally enga.ged in when a third person was injured; but the 
master WIll be held responsible, unless it clearly appears that 
t~e servant could not have been directly or indirectly serving 
hIS master.': Thus, if the accident had occurred on the trip 
from the daIry to the Hanson home prior to 4 p. m., the jury 
clearly could have found that Morrison was acting within his 
employment although he intended thereafter to get something 
to eat, and. take Dolan home. [7] Further, a deviation from 
the most direct route for these purposes before going to the 
Hanson home would not necessarily have constituted an aban-
donment. (See Westberg v. Will de, 14 Ca1.2d 360,372 [94 P 
2d 590] ; Gain v. Marquez, 31 Cal.App.2d 430 [88 P.2d 200] : 
Gayton v. Pacific Fruit Express, 127 Cal.App. 50 [15 P.2d 217) ; 
K~use v. White Bros., 81 Cal.App. 86 [253 P. 178] ; Dennis v. 
M~ller Automobil~ Go., 73 Cal.App. 293 [238 P. 739].) In 
the Kruse and Cam cases, supra, detours of several miles were 
held to present questions of fact. The deviation cases al-
th~ugh not identical ~ith the situation here involved,' are 
qUIte analogous. MorrIson, upon finding no one at home, be-
Jan. 1944} LOPER v. MORRTSON 
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lieved that he would have to wait over an hour before he could 
see Mrs. Hanson. If he had spent this time in his car in front 
of the house he would have remained within the scope of his 
employment. [8] His conduct in going elsewhere for some 
private purpose while waiting to perform his specific duties 
presented a question of fact as to whether he had entirel~ 
abandoned the business of his employer. (See Robertson v. 
Spitler, 153 Minn. 395 [190 N.W. 992].) The employer might 
reasonably expect that his employee,· while so waiting, would 
engage in some activities for his own purposes. Here, Morri-
son, who began work'at 3 a. m., had not eaten since breakfast, 
and the fact that he went to a tavern for sandwiches and beer 
does not require us to hold that he had abandoned his employ. 
ment, particularly in view of his testiinony that he would not 
have been at the tavern if he had not been waiting to call upon 
Mrs. Hanson. And, considering the time he had to wait, 
we cannot hold as a matter of law that it was unreasonable 
for him to travel somewhat less than two miles for this pur-
pose. Similarly, under these circuITlStances, we cannot say 
that his going a short distance farther to take Dolan home 
was such an unreasonable means of using his time that it 
must be deemed an abandonment of his employment. Mor· 
rison's purpose at the time of the accident was to serve his 
employer, and it could be reasonably inferred that such pur-
pose continued throughout the period he waited to see Mrs. 
Hanson. The evidence was sufficient to support a finding 
that Morrison was acting within the scope of his employment 
at the time of the accident. ' 
Defendant also contends that the ~rial court erred in 
excluding from evidence a portion of ,a hospital chart called 
a "nurses' record." The chart contained entries by nurses 
relative to the condition of the plaintiff during the time she 
spent in the hospital after the accident, and was offered to 
refute testimony as to the nature and ex~ent of plaintiff's 
mJuries, Defendant contends that the record should have 
been admitted under sections 1953e·1953h of the Code of 
Civil Procedure, known as the "Uniform Business Records 
as Evidence Act." Section 1953f provides: "A record of an 
act, condition or event, shall, in so far as relevant, be com· 
petent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness 
testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and 




608 LOPER V. MORRISON [23 C.2d 
the time of the act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion 
of the court, the sources of information, method and time of 
preparation were such as to justify its admission." Section 
1953e provides: "The term 'business' as used in this artide 
sha~l include every kind of business, profession, occupation, 
call1l1g or operation of institutions, whether carried on for 
profit or not." Section 1953g requires that "This article 
shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its gen-
eral purpose to make uniform the law of those States which 
enact it." [9] The purpose of this act is to enlarge the 
operation of the business records exception to the hearsay 
evidence rule. The common law exception is based o~ 
the assumption that records kept in the O'eneral course of 
business usually are accurate, and may be'" used in case of 
necessity, as evidence of the matter recorded. cI-Iale, Hospi-
tal Re~ords as Evidence, 14 So.Cal.L.Rev. 99, 100.) But the 
exceptIOn has been hedged about with so many burdensome 
restrictions that legislation has been necessary to secure wide-
s?r~ad use. of ~uch rec0rds. Speaking of the desirability of 
SImIlar legIslatIOn, the United States Supreme Court, in the 
recent case of Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 [63 S.Ot. 4;77, 
481, 87 L.Ed. 645, 144 A.L.R. 719J), stated: "The several 
hundred years of history behind the Act (Wigmore supra 
sees. 1517-1520) indicate the nature of the reforms ~hich it 
was designed to effect. It should of course be liberally inter-
preted so as to do away with the anachronistic rules which 
gave rise to its need and at which it was aimed." 
[10] The business entry statutes are not limited to entries 
~n commer~ial. enterprises, and hospital records are properly 
ll1~luded wIthIll theIr operation. (Ulm v. Moore-McCormack 
L~nes, 115 F.2d 492; Borucki v. MacIfenzie Bros. Co., 125 
Conn. 92 [3 A.2d 224] ; Beverley Beach Club, Inc. v. Marron, 
172 Md. 471 [192 A. 278]; Gile v. Hudnutt, 279 Mich. 358 
[272 N.W. 706] ; Conlon v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 
56 R.I. 88 [183 A. 850] ; and see VI, Wigmore on Evidence 
(3d ed.), sec. 1707, p. 36; 14 So.Cal.L.Rev. 104; 144 A.L.R. 
731.) There is no reason to believe that a hospital record is 
not as truthful as a record kept by a commercial firm. It is 
a rec~rd upon which treatment of the patient is based and e~perIe.nce .has shown it to be reliable and trustworthy. '(See 
dISCUSSIOn III Globe Indemnity Co. v. Reinhart, 152 Md. 439, 
447 [137 A. 431.) [11] It is the object of the business 
records statutes to eliminate the necessity of calling each wit-
Jan. 1944] LOPER V. MORRISON 
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ness, and to substitute the record of the, transaction or event. 
It is not necessary that the person making the entry have 
personal knowledge of the transaction. (Storm & Butts v. 
Lipscomb, 117 Cal.App. 6, 20 [3 P.2d 567] ; Patrick v. Tetz-
laff, 46 Cal.App. 243 [189 P. 115] j Massachusetts Bonding & 
Ins. Co. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 18 F.2d 934, 937.) Plain-
tiff cites several California cases in support of its contention 
that hospital records are not admissible in evidence. (Estate· 
of Flint, 100 Cal. 391 [34 P. 863]; Pierce v. Paterson, 50 
Cal.App.2d 486 [123 P.2d 544] ; Lusardi v. Prukop, 116 Cal. 
App. 506 [2 P.2d 870].) All of these cases were tried before 
the Uniform Act became effective in this state, and are not 
controlling. ' 
[12] The Uniform Act provides that the record is com-
petent evidence if authenticated in the prescribed man-. 
ner and ". . . if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of 
information, method and time of preparation were such as 
to justify its admission." (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1953f.) De-
fendant argues that the foundation presented in this case 
was sufficient to justify the admission of the nurses' record 
in evidence and that therefore it was error for the court to 
exclude it. It is unnecessary, however, for us to determine 
whether the trial court was justified in rejecting the record 
on these grounds since we are of the opiD.ion no error preju-
dicial to the defendant has been shown by its exclusion. 
Before this court can reverse a judgment for improper ex-
clusion of evidence, an examination of the entire cause must· 
show that the error complained of resulted in a miscarriage 
of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, sec. 4%.) The testimony 
which the nurses' record was offered to refute was to the ef-
fect that while plaintiff was in the hospital she suffered from 
headac~es and many painful bruises and sore spots, that she 
was nervous and hysterical, and that she was given pills to 
help her to sleep and to ease her pain. The nurses' record 
does not refute this evidence. In fact many notations in the 
chart support plaintiff's testimony. Those notations show 
that plaintiff had frequent headaches and suffered from pain 
hi. various parts of her body, that she was nervous, and that 
she was given a considerable quantity of sedatives and other 
drugs. Defendant argues that other notations in the chart 
to the effect that plaintiff did not complain, or that she was 
23 C.2d-20 
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comfortable, resting or sleeping, refute evidence of pain and 
suffering. The entry "no complaints" as it was used here 
does not indicate that plaintiff did not suffer, nor that she 
did not complain of her pain and nervousness. A witness 
called by defendant to authenticate the chart testified that 
it was the practice of the nurse who kept the chart to make 
the entry "no complaints" whenever nothing special was re-
ported to her by the nurse in charge of the patient. And 
notations that plaintiff slept or rested, and that she was com-
fortable at times, do not contradict the specific evidence as 
to her pain and suffering. Therefore, while the nurses' chart 
contained relevant evidence on the issue of the nature and 
extent of plaintiff's injuries, we cannot say that its exclusion 
resulted in a miscarriage of justice. 
[13] Defendant contends further that even though full 
credence be given the testimony introduced by plaintiff, the 
judgment awarding plaintiff $2,000 and her husband $600 
was excessive. An appellate court will not disturb a verdict 
unless it is so grossly excessive as to immediately suggest 
passion or prejudice, or corruption on the part of the jnry. 
(Loeb v. Kimmerle, 215 Cal. 143, 164 [9 P.2d 199]; Stan-
hope v. Los Angeles College of Chiropractic, 54 Cal.App.2d 
!41, 148 [~28 P.2d 7?5P Plaintiff spent twenty-six days 
In the hospItal. Her InJnr.y caused her much pain and suf-
fering, both physical and mental, while she was at the hos-
pital and after she went home. Doctor and hospital bills 
exceeded. $400, and money was expended to repair the IJopers' 
automobIle. For some time plaintiff was unable to carryon 
her usual duties helping her husband with his business. This 
evidence is sufficient to justify the amount awarded. 
[14] It is contended that the trial court was guilty of 
prejud~cial misconduct. Many remarks of the trial judge 
are claImed to be erroneous, but only two were assigned as 
error at the trial. Both of these remarks were made to de-
fendant's attorney in connection with rulings on the admissi-
bility of evidence. They could not be construed as indicat-
ing that the judge was in any way partial toward plaintiff 
or her case, and the jury was specifically instructed that if 
the judge had said or done anything which indicated that he 
was inclined to favor either party, it should be disregarded. 
P5.] Def~ndant argues that the court erred in giving cer-
tam mstructlOns dealing with respondeat superior. These 
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instructions properly stated the theory we have already found 
applicable in this case. [16] Defendant further claims that 
the court improperly refused to give instructions defining 
"scope of employment" and stating the rule that abandon-
ment of employment by the employee relieves the e:inployer 
from liability. But other instructions which were given 
adequately covered these subjects. [17] Defendant also 
contends that the court erred in giving instructions dealing 
with future damage, because, it is claimed, there was no evi-
dence to support such damage. There was testimony,how-
ever, that at the time of the trial plaintiff still was suffering 
from headaches, nervousness and pain. This evidence tended 
to prove future damages and was sufficient to justify the in-
struction. (See Bauman v. City and County of San Fran-
cisco, 42 Cal.App.2d 144, 163 [108 P.2d 989] ; Parsell v. San 
Diego Consolo G. & E. Co., 46 Cal.App.2d· 212[115 P.2d 
539] .) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. I cannot agree that it is a ques-
tion of fact whether Morrison was acting within the scope 
of his employment at the time of the accident. If the facts 
are undisputed it is a question of law whether liability arises 
from such facts. (San Diego Trust & Savings Bank v. San 
Diego County, 16 Ca1.2d 142 [105 P.2d 94, 133 A.L.R. 416] ; 
Leis V. City and COttnty of San Francisco, 213 Cal. 256, 258 
[2 P.2d 26] ; Gaston V. Hisashi Tsuruda, 5 Cal.App,2d 639, 
642 [43 P.2d 355] ; Bell V. McColgan, 68 Cal.App. 478, 482 
[229 P. 858]; Osgood v. City of San Diego, 17 Cal.App.2d 
345 [62 P.2d 195].) Ordinarily the court must decide such 
questions, although occasionally the task may fall to the jury. 
Thus in the field of negligence if the court does not establish 
a standard of reasonable conduct the case goes to the jury 
to determine whether the defendant has acted as a reason-
ably prudent man would act under the circumstances. The 
jury then has the burden not only of deciding what the facts 
are but of formulating a standard of reasonable conduct. 
(Clinkscales V. Carver, 22 Ca1.2d 72, 75 [136 P.2d 777].) 
As a general rule, however, the court determines. the law and 
the jury the facts, unless it appears that the issue is one that 
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the jury can determine better than the court. (See Brown, 
Law and Fact, 56 Harv.L.Rev. 899.) In the present case the 
court can determine better than the jury the extent of the 
vicarious liability to which the Arden Milk Company should 
be subject. 
The majority opinion cites section 228, comment d, of the 
Restatement of Agency, which states that it is the function 
of the court to determine whether an act of a servant is within 
the scope of his employment "if the answer is clearly indi-
cated, " but that otherwise the question is for the jury. If 
the facts are undisputed, however, it is solely a question of 
law whether acts are within the scope of the employment. 
If the question of law is a complicated one there is all the 
more reason that it should' be determined by the court rather 
than the jury. 
There is no dispute as to the facts in the present case. After 
reaching the place where he was to collect a bill, Morrison 
left to obtain a meal, transport Dolan home, and await the 
time for another effort to collect the bill. The undisputed 
evidence shows that it was no part of Morrison's duty to take 
Dolan home, and that he did so merely as a personal favor. 
The accident occurred on the way back from Dolan's home, 
some twenty blocks from the nearest point of Morrison's as-' 
signed territory. It is my opinion that Morrison was return-
ing from a personal mission and had not resumed his em-
ployment at the time of the accident and was therefore not 
then acting within the scope of his employment. (Oordoy v. 
Flaherty, 9 Ca1.2d 716 [72 P.2d 538] ; Peccolo v. Oity of Los 
Angeles, 8 Ca1.2d 532 [66 P.2d 651] ; Kish v. Oalifornia State 
Automobile Assn., 190 Cal. 246 [212 P. 27]; Martinelli v. 
Stabnau, 11 Cal.App.2d 38 [52 P.2d 956] ; Hanchett v. Wise-
ley, 107 Cal.App. 230 [290 P. 311] ; Adams v. Tuxedo Land 
00., 92 Cal.App. 266 [267 P. 926] ; Helm v. Bagley, 113 Cal. 
App. 602 [298 P. 826].) 
Edmonds, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied February 
17, 1944. Traynor, J., voted for a rehearing. 
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[Sac. No. 5519. In Bank. Jan. 25, 1944.] 
ROBERT E. BOYD, as Executor, etc., Appellant, v. W. L. 
OSER, as Administrator with the Will Annexed, etc., 
Respondent. 
[1] Husband and Wife-Rights in Income from Community Prop-
erty-Law Applicable.-The respective rights of the spouses in 
the income from community property are determined by the 
law existing at the date of acquisition of the capital or orig-
inal community property from which such income arose; and 
where the wife's rights at that date did not include the power 
of testamentary disposition of the incoli1~ from community 
property, that right was in the husband and could not be im-
paired or destroyed by subsequent legislation. 
[2] Id.-Testamentary Disposition of Community Property by 
Wife.-Where the husband's rights under the law in force at 
the date of acquisition of community property included the 
right of retaining title to and control over the whole commu-
nity property, including the income therefrom, upon the wife's 
death, such right could not be divested or impaired by pro-
visions in the wife's will which, if effective, would operate 
to take from the husband upon her death a portion of either 
the capital property or accumulations of the income there-
from, as this would be an unconstitutional impairment of a 
vested property right. 
[3] 
[4] 
Id.-Testamentary Disposition of Community Property by 
Wife.-A wife does not have the power of testamentary dis-
position over the income from community property acquired 
prior to the effective date of the 1923 amendment of Civ. Code, 
§ 1401 (now Prob. Code, § 201), which declares that, on the 
. death of either spouse, one-half of the community property 
belongs to the surviving spouse and the other half is subject 
to testamentary disposition of the decedent, although such in-
come may have accrued or have been received by the spouses 
subsequent to the amendment. 
Id.-Rents, Issue!> and Pro:fits.-Although there is no constitu-
tional or statutory provision expressly declaring that rents, 
issues and profits of community property shall partake of, the 
[2] See 3 Cal.Jur. Ten-year SUpp. 704. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Husband and Wife, § 96, [2,3, 5] 
Husband and Wife, § 144~. [4] Husband and Wife, § 58. 
